This paper asks what it is that we are doing when we talk about trust in international politics. It begins by reviewing the recent and growing body of research on trust and International Relations (IR), locating this more nascent collection of literature within a wider, established body of social science work on trust in disciplines such as psychology, political science, business and management studies. It claims that the existing literature is based on particular practices of representation that unquestioningly attempt to find the correct meaning for trust and that this representational account of meaning limits the form of the research, carrying assumptions about meaning that lead to several semantic and methodological problems. The paper challenges this way of understanding through the use of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and proposes an alternative, grammatical approach to trust and IR based on ‗meaning as use'. To illustrate this, the paper then conducts a grammatical investigation of the use of trust regarding nuclear arms control with the Soviet Union during the second term of the Reagan presidency. This challenges the familiar narrative of the role of trust at this time by going back to the ‗rough ground' of President Reagan's speech on trust and nuclear weapons.
Introduction
There is a rapidly expanding body of literature on trust and trust-building in International Relations (IR) and trust has been used as a theme of several publications, academic conferences and workshops. This growing body of scholarship on trust has promoted the concept as providing a valuable and distinctive contribution to our discipline that could offer a new way in which to However, there are certain assumptions about meaning that are necessary to enable the idea of trust as a viable tool of analysis in international politics in the way the current research proposes.
This includes the acceptance of a certain level of stability of meaning across time and space, as well as the idea that one can uncover a true or general understanding of a word. The existing research takes this for granted and is thus beginning with assumptions about meaning that become inbuilt in the types of questions it is possible to ask using the word. This paper claims that an implicit but ubiquitous assumption of meaning as representation underpins the existing literature, and that this assumption precedes and limits the range of possibilities for the form of the subsequent research.
The existing literature is based on particular practices of representation that unquestioningly attempt to find the correct meaning for trust. The question posed, either explicitly or implicitly, is ‗what is trust?' To understand trust is therefore to gain insight into the ‗essence' of a stable and uniform thing that a) exists in the world and b) is represented by the word ‗trust'. The literature, while displaying superficial differences, is therefore all founded on the same claim to accurately represent trust, which in turn relies on a particular, picture theory of meaning.
This paper proposes an alternative approach to meaning in general, and to trust specifically, using Ludwig Wittgenstein's assertion that, in general, the meaning of a word is its use in everyday speech. 4 It argues that taking the word ‗trust' out of the context in which it is used for its meaning to be analysed on a purely theoretical level results in the creation of a set of challenges and limitations in its study. It will instead advocate an approach to language that regards it as a practice rather than the knowledge of a set of words that correspond to things in reality. In doing so it will show how the Wittgensteinian description of language as ‗part of an activity' both brings to light and challenges the assumptions within the search for correct meaning throughout the existing research.
5
The paper provides an illustration of the grammatical approach by conducting an investigation of President Ronald Reagan's use of trust regarding nuclear arms control with the Soviet Union. The grammatical investigation of Reagan's public speech and archival administration documents shows how the meaning for ‗trust' as practised by the Reagan White House in this context was used as a strategic tool to link nuclear arms control to the issue of human rights; ‗trust' in this instance implicitly contained a particular set of US political goals. By going back to the ‗rough ground' of Cold War diplomatic speech, the case study illustrates how the Wittgensteinian approach exposes the political nature of the meaning of trust in this context. The case study thereby shows the potential of the grammatical perspective for a practice and context-based approach to 4 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), 43.
5 Ibid., 23.
meaning that has the ability to acknowledge the implicit and complex meanings that are lost to IR when one adapts a representational approach.
While this research focuses on the literature on trust and IR based on the recent increase in academic interest in this topic, there are several other words that could also benefit from the grammatical approach proposed here such as sovereignty, fear or power. There have been
Wittgensteinian interventions into debates on the meaning of other big concepts in politics. Shane
Mulligan has conducted a conceptual history of legitimacy in international affairs through an incorporation of Wittgenstein's discussion of language games. 6 Jonathan Havercroft uses
Wittgenstein's description of changing aspects to argue that political philosophers should discuss liberty as an ‗aspectival concept'. 7 Véronique Pin-Fat has undertaken a grammatical reading of the expression of universality in literature on ethics and IR. 8 This paper contributes to this literature by
showing how the dilemmas of definition and explanation in the current literature on trust are selfimposed by the unreflective adoption of a picture theory of meaning.
The paper proceeds in several parts; first providing a brief overview of the current literature on trust in IR before illustrating how the current scholarship all rests on a particular representational view of meaning that both limits the type of research that can be conducted and imposes specific methods of explanation. It then challenges this dominant approach to meaning through the challenge of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. The paper suggests that an alternative approach to meaning that goes back to the rough ground of context and meaning as use could provide a more critical and self-reflective study of trust in international politics. The paper finally conducts a grammatical investigation of President Ronald Reagan's use of trust regarding nuclear arms control with the Soviet Union. This challenges the familiar claim of the role of trust at this time by going back to the ‗rough ground' of Reagan's speech on trust and nuclear weapons during his second term.
The Study of Trust in International Relations
On first glance there is much variation within the literature on trust and IR. This includes work on rational choice, cognitive psychology, sociology and emotions and IR. However, despite this seeming disparity, all the existing literature implicitly endorses a specific, representational account of meaning. This representational account presupposes a thing called ‗trust' that is represented by the use of the word ‗trust' and can therefore be identified or measured according to the parameters outlined by the researcher. This section will briefly outline the differing accounts of trust before arguing that these ostensibly disparate versions actually rely on the same representational approach to understanding their main concept.
A common portrayal of trust within the IR literature is that of trust as a rational choice. The rational choice school of trust scholarship deals with portraying specific actors that are selfinterested, rational agents who make strategic decisions in particular, limited contexts of potential cooperation. 9 These decisions can be influenced by managing preferences and outcomes external to the actor. Trust in this account is a cognitive notion and is discussed as the calculation that another party is potentially trustworthy (i.e. cooperative) in a given situation.
Several authors have criticised the rational choice accounts for ignoring the dispositional, emotional and interpersonal components of trust and have put forward alternative explanations.
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Brian Rathbun and Deborah Larson propose conceptions of trust and cooperation based on social and cognitive psychology respectively. 11 Jonathan Mercer suggests that trust is an ‗emotional belief' that can be explained with social identity theory. 12 In their work on the security dilemma, Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler argue for an emotional base to trust and propose that trust is a ‗mix of feeling and rational thinking'. 13 Jan Ruzicka and Nicholas Wheeler propose an approach, based upon the work of Martin Hollis, which considers trust as binding. 14 Inspired by authors such as Vincent Pouliot, Torsten Michel argues for the incorporation of a more non-conscious and inarticulate approach to the idea of trust that has its origins in the idea of the ‗logic of practicality'.
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The existing literature is thus based on an impression of difference, loosely divided along a rationalist/non-rationalist divide. 16 However, these superficial differences actually obscure a more
fundamental agreement on what trust is and how it can be studied. All these multiple ways of conceptualising trust within IR rest on the same basic unexpressed assumption, that the word ‗trust'
represents a concrete and stable meaning (or set of meanings with a baseline set of necessary and sufficient conditions) and can be defined, understood and agreed on an abstract level. That this is possible is taken for granted, but actually rests on a set of assumptions about language as a representation of the world. The tendency throughout the trust literature to adopt an uncritically representational account of meaning leads to certain problematic inclinations in its study. This results in the imposition of certain methodological imperatives on the research that demands particular and often problematic types of explanation.
There are three main imperatives that this paper will outline. The first is the urge to define trust; by conceptualising the word trust as representing a particular meaning, the ensuing question Hoffman also argues that trust is not predictability. 25 Larson differentiates between trust and expectation while Vincent Keating and Jan Ruzicka claim that trust is not the same as confidence.
26
These examples illustrate how the need to base the study of trust on agreement in definition leads into a sometimes unproductive discourse over correct meaning that tends both to simplify and complicate the study of trust in ways that are not helpful, as well as at times reducing debate to the mere production of thesis and antithesis, ‗so we battle back and forth like the tone of an argument between 2 small children. -Es ist doch nicht es-aber es ist doch so‖'.
27
Apart from the difficulties illustrated above in the execution of a definition of trust, in practice, if one accepts the picture of language as representation and the subsequent necessity for trust to be defined on an abstract level, there are two possible variations of compromise one can accept in order to deal with the ambiguity of meaning: either to define trust very loosely or in very specific terms. Each of those two compromises has its own problems in terms of an actual contribution to understanding international politics. If one creates a very broad, general definition for one's purpose, one runs the risk of being able to make everything and anything fit into a narrative of trust, thus explaining little. In contrast, if one takes a very specific definition of trust, one is left with the proposition that ‗according to my definition of trust as -x‖ in specific circumstances -y‖ this is an occasion of trust'. This circular explanation may be technically accurate, but again, has a problem with how much it can actually contribute to furthering an understanding of politics.
The second imperative of the representational view of meaning and trust is that it does not allow for self-reflection on the type of practice involved in the search for the correct meaning of trust and how this may induce one to think about trust in a way that will naturally shape one's conception of the term. This is evident in the encouragement within the literature to seek out multi-and interdisciplinary approaches to trust in order to discover an overarching account of trust within the social sciences; trust is promoted as a potentially unifying factor for disparate disciplines. 28 consists of a practice of rule-following that comes prior to interpretation and ‗must consist in the unmediated ability to ‗grasp' a sign manifested in actual praxis'.
40
Rather than meaning as representation, in most cases the meaning of a word is its use in everyday speech. 41 Therefore the meaning of a word cannot be taken out of the context wherein it is expressed to be analysed on a universal and purely theoretical level but is the use of a word in everyday speech. Meaning as use is therefore a warning against the urge to generalise above or delve below the surface level of language. It highlights the dangers of presenting meaning as a preconceived notion to which we then amend our experiences. The idea that a concept such as trust can mean one, or two, or even 50 different things that all have a minimum baseline of attributes in common and a definite boundary around them is thus denied, as meaning does not encompass this sort of universality or require these set limits. There is no set space wherein the meaning of the word rests but instead a ‗family resemblance' of intersecting characteristics in the ways the word ‗trust' is used.
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If language is acknowledged as an activity, taking a word in isolation and asking what it means takes it out of the activity in which it is bestowed with meaning and thus renders it less meaningful. Therefore I can tell someone that I trust them, can read a hotel bill that says ‗we trust you have enjoyed your stay', or exclaim ‗trust her to do that', and the meaning of the word ‗trust'
expressed, though different in each case, is clear to anyone who is enmeshed in the practice of our language game. It is only when one takes the word out of this practice to ask ‗what does it mean to say the word -trust‖?' that its meaning becomes in any way unclear. Thus the common assumption that language is a representation of reality is a restrictive force, it causes us to think that we are able to outline the nature of a thing, to explain the meaning of a word, because words stand for certain things in ‗reality' when indeed we are simply recreating our own version of that meaning. One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it.
A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably [emphasis in original].
43
It is the acceptance of this ‗picture' of language that is problematic in the study of trust. By implicitly accepting that one can find a meaning for the word trust in its representational sense, it becomes tempting to view the notional meaning that one sets around the word as somehow correct or real.
Studying a concept such as trust with an uncritically representational approach to meaning can induce hypostatisation of the concept, giving presence to a meaning that has merely been placed around a limitless concept in order to fulfil a certain course of study, and then promoting a view of this construct as a viable object of study in itself.
The Grammatical Approach
The idea that taking a word away from its use removes the word's meaning is one reason that the Wittgensteinian challenge of ‗meaning as use' renders unanswerable the question ‗what is trust?' that is the inclination embedded in the trust literature. This presents, as Pin-Fat asserts, ‗an insurmountable problem for any form of explanation (including explanations in IR) that rests on the -discovery‖ of a property that is common to all instances of phenomena under investigation'. 44 The search for this property demanded by the question ‗what is trust?' implicit in the existing literature in IR places a notional theoretical boundary around the word that does not exist in the ordinary way the word is used. This results in distance between the language under examination, and our ability to understand it.
The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement...The conflict becomes intolerable;...We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Rather than a prescription for a method, it is perhaps best to think of the grammatical approach as an admission or a reminder of the limitations that inform our descriptions. Pitkin speaks of a kind of self-knowledge ‗that ‗[h]owever much we struggle to define the essence of a concept, or to defend the essence we think we have found, we cannot escape our tacit knowledge of how words are actually used'. 52 The method of description is not a method in traditional terms but thus an attempt to read with a ‗self-knowledge' of the implications of our attitude to meaning. It is an admonition against the struggle to overcome the inconsistencies and contradictions of meaning and a reminder that these very inconsistencies and contradictions are the rough ground on which language works. Reforming the commonly asked questions from ‗what does trust mean?' to the more rights; to ‗trust' in this instance meant to adhere to a particular set of US policy prescriptions implicit in the contextual meaning of the word. This crucial context, which is brought to light through the grammatical approach, is absent from the study of trust and IR when one takes a representational view of meaning.
When President Reagan used trust in his speech it was often alongside words such as ‗freedom', ‗people', ‗liberty', ‗democracy' and ‗faith'. This was Reagan's grammar of trust, one that was linked to the values of conservative America and often expressed using the phrase ‗trust the people'. Reagan used many variants of the phrase ‗trust the people' throughout his time in office. 54 In a typical address in 1984 he claimed that ‗the doom-criers will always be with us. And they'll always be wrong about America until they realize progress begins with trusting the people'. 55 He declared that it was ‗time to put trust back in the hands of the people', 56 and repeatedly claimed that 1979. 59 Reagan claimed that the problems of the 1970s were ‗brought about by government leaders who for too long were afraid to trust the American people'. 60 It was an opportune time for a politician who could convincingly speak trust, one who represented ‗leadership that trusts in you and the power of your dreams'. 61 Reagan thus contrasted himself with the leaders ‗back in the late seventies' a time when ‗we'd lost respect overseas, and we no longer trusted our leaders to defend peace and freedom'. 62 Reagan's ‗trust the people' was also a distinctly American trust. This is evident in many of his speeches in which he made statements such as ‗[t]rust the people-this is the crucial lesson of history and America's message to the world', 63 and ‗America has a secret weapon; it's called -trust the people‖'. themselves were not the challenge; it was the underlying lack of trust between states that had created the problem of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were therefore the result of the inability of states to trust each other.
This can be seen in several statements on the damaging nature of mistrust in the international.
In an interview in October 1985 before the Geneva Summit, Reagan first used a quote that became a regular feature of his speech:
I have a little thing here that I copied out of an article the other day, and the author of the article uttered a very great truth: ‗‗Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed. They arm themselves because they distrust each other.'' Well, I hope that in the summit maybe we can find ways that we can prove by deed-not just words, but by deeds-that there is no need for distrust between us.
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In another interview in November, Reagan again identified the ‗distrust that causes the problems and causes the situation with regard to nuclear arms negotiations'. 66 This connection implied that the Soviet Union would need to prove that it was trustworthy before becoming a partner in arms control, thus placing a set of implicit preconditions on any agreement.
When nuclear arms control talks between the United States and the Soviet Union resumed in
Geneva in March 1985, the administration viewed initial Soviet proposals as propaganda efforts.
Gorbachev was proving to be much more adept than his predecessors at positively influencing international public opinion and, as Ambassador Max Kampelman admitted, ‗[g]one...were the days when the Reagan administration could rely on the Soviets to serve as their own worst enemies in public relations'. 67 In October, Gorbachev proposed a 50 percent reduction in strategic arms. The
White House received this with scepticism, privately characterising it as ‗clearly a propaganda attempt to put the ball in the US court'. 68 A memorandum from Secretary of State George Shultz to President Reagan on the subject described it as ‗one sided and self-serving' and ‗obviously designed The administration responded to these initiatives by placing the proposals within a wider political context. The official public diplomacy strategy advised keeping proposals ‗in perspective of broader US/Soviet agenda'. 72 One way the administration managed this was by creating a connection between nuclear arms control and human rights within the language of ‗trust the people' in order to undermine the legitimacy of any proposals the Soviet Union might make.
When Reagan spoke of the Soviet Union and human rights, it was therefore within the grammar of ‗trust the people'. He frequently repeated variations of the phrase ‗a country that distrusts its own people cannot be trusted'. Human rights were a matter of trusting the people and the Soviet Union, by not trusting its people, was inherently untrustworthy. If one accepted this connection, the responsibility would always be on the Soviet Union to prove its trustworthiness, or continue to be responsible for the problem of trust in the international and therefore the problem of nuclear weapons. This created a link between any action that the US might take (or fail to take) on nuclear arms control to the human rights practices of the Soviet Union as though there was a causal relationship between these two things, which became a valuable way of answering any accusations of US intransigence in nuclear arms control negotiations. closely watch the condition of human rights within the Soviet Union. It is difficult to imagine that a government that continues to repress freedom in its own country, breaking faith with its own people, can be trusted to keep agreements with others. 81 After the Washington Summit in December, Reagan continued to talk about trust and human rights, telling reporters he had explained to Gorbachev ‗how difficult it is for the people of the Western democracies to have trust in a government that doesn't trust its own people and denies their human rights'. 82 The great benefit of this use of trust as ‗trust the people' was that it transcended any specific concessions that the Soviet Union might make, for as Reagan The grammatical approach to trust taken here not only shows how the search for the ‗correct' meaning of trust in the existing literature obscures the potential for seeing meaning in use, but also forces us to question what has become familiar in much discourse on the era; the idea that trust played a role at this time and that this ‗trust' can be taken apart and understood out of context. The study shows that, while the Reagan/Gorbachev era has often been framed in terms of trust, this connection can also be understood as a result of a set of decisions by the Reagan administration to link nuclear arms control with a particular meaning for trust. By doing so it provides a redescription 83 Ronald Reagan, Remarks at a White House Briefing for Human Rights Supporters, 3 December of the era that allows us to view the political nature of the use of trust, something that cannot be addressed by the representational approach.
Conclusion
This paper has claimed that the existing literature on trust is based on a problematic assumption that one must find the ‗meaning' for trust and thereby understand and operationalise its role in international politics. The paper suggests that, alternatively, it is in grammar, the place of the word ‗trust' in the form of life that is our language, where one can find meanings for trust. This approach challenges the very idea of the effectiveness of attempting to gain consensus on what trust means.
The challenge, as Pin-Fat claims, ‗opens space for us to ask, though not yet answer, how it is that rules appear ‗natural' as a representation of ‗how things are'; how ‗reality' is constituted and its effects'. 88 In this way, according to Fierke, it is ‗implicitly critical, insofar as it demonstrates the power of language, its social underpinning and its ability to constrain and bewitch'.
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By conducting an investigation of President Reagan's use of trust regarding nuclear arms control with the Soviet Union, the paper also demonstrates how going back to the rough ground of context allows for a more complex and political description of trust and IR. Its contribution is in recognising how the terms we use to talk about the world will necessarily frame what we can and cannot ask. Therefore asking how these terms, such as the idea of a ‗role of trust' in both the study of IR and the practice of diplomacy, come about and are used can offer an alternative account to unquestioningly accepting the validity of these terms as tools of understanding and thus accepting their boundaries.
Though this paper is focused on trust, the challenge applies beyond the study of trust to many other words used as tools of explanation in IR and makes the wider point that before we begin by asking ‗what does a word mean?' we should first reflect on the assumptions about meaning that go into the form of these questions. We should question whether current debates over ‗what is the meaning of' trust and other words fall prey to the universalist temptation of ignoring the ‗rough ground' of context, practice and the everyday. This is important in two ways. First because as this paper has discussed, the approach to trust in the existing literature places a distance between the ‗study of trust' in IR and other ways in which the word ‗trust' is used. Second, because talking about politics in terms of trust necessarily privileges certain concepts and actions that are related to a specific grammar of trust and undermines those that are not. When trust becomes embedded in the form of our questions, it places a boundary around the world of potential answers. There are limitations in what one can see if one is framing international politics in terms of trust, so that trust becomes, as Wittgenstein describes ‗like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at', and we are left with the problem that it ‗never occurs to us to take them off'. 90 There may be no need to demand the dismantling of the pictures of trust as ‗playing a role' within IR, but there is a need to acknowledge that these are particular pictures of the world, and thus an attempt to understand the implications and limitations of the frame.
Author biography
Laura Considine is a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leeds, UK.
Funding
This research was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council's Global Uncertainties programme and the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth University.
